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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS--RIGHT TO
ENFORCEMENT

DERIVED

FROM

FIFTH

AND

SIXTH

AMEND

MENTs--COOper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ralph Cooper, following a narcotics arrest, became a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) informer under the federal
government's Witness Protection Program.! He subsequently made
several valuable contacts for DEA agents resulting in the indict
ments of several persons on narcotics charges. While under the
DEA's protection, Cooper contacted one of the persons against
whom he was to testify and offered to remove himself as a witness
for $10,000. 2 As a result, Cooper was arrested and indicted on two
counts of bribery of a witness 3 and two counts of obstruction of
justice. 4
Approximately two months before Cooper's trial, an assistant
United States attorney met with Cooper's lawyer to discuss a pos
sible plea bargain. 5 The Government's attorney proposed a plea
agreement under which Cooper would be removed from the Wit
ness Protection Program, remain incarcerated, continue to
cooperate with the federal authorities, plead guilty to one count of
obstruction of justice, and testifY on three occasions in the ongoing
narcotics trial. In return, the Government would bring Cooper's
cooperation to the court's attention and would dismiss all other
counts of the indictment. Cooper's lawyer agreed to communicate

1. The Witness Protection Program evolved from the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) (see note preceding § 3481) and is funded under
28 U.S.C. § 524 (1976). The program, operated by the United States Marshals Ser
vice, provides assistance to select government witnesses including protection, new
identities, relocation, housing, and medical care. [1979] Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP.
79-80.
2. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 13-14 (4th Cir. 1979).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976).
4. Id. § 1503.
5. See notes 17-28 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the plea bar
gaining process.
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the proposal to Cooper and to report back to the Government
promptly. 6
After being fully informed about the plea bargain, Cooper7
agreed to the proposal. Meanwhile, however, the assistant United
States attorney had met with his superior and had heen instructed
to withdraw the proposal. Approximately three hours later, Coop
er's attorney contacted the assistant United States attorney, but
before he was able to convey Cooper's acceptance, the Government's
attorney revoked the offer. 8 Cooper moved to compel enforcement
of the plea bargain proposal at a pretrial hearing, but the motion
was denied by the district court.9 He was convicted lO and sen
tenced to fifteen years imprisonment. l l
In Cooper v. United States,12 Cooper appealed the district
court's refusal to compel enforcement of the Government's plea bar
gain proposal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found constitutional error, vacated the judgment, and re
manded with instructions that Cooper be allowed to enter a guilty
plea on one count of obstruction of justice and that all other counts
be dismissed. 13 The court held that the Government's failure to
honor its plea proposal violated Cooper's guarantee of substantive
due process under the fifth amendment and denied him effective
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. 14 This decision
enforcing the Government's plea proposal on constitutional grounds
was a substantial departure from existing precedent which uni
6. 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979). At oral argument, the court was advised by
Cooper's counsel that the assistant United States attorney, in making the plea pro
posal, had represented that it would be held open for acceptance for a week. The
record indicates a substantial concession on this point by the attorney for the Gov
ernment. The Government's attorney testified as to the validity of the proposal on
cross-examination at the pretrial hearing of the motion to compel enforcement of the
plea proposal. Id. at n.2.
7. Cooper was incarcerated during the plea offer and acceptance. Id. at 15.
B. The assistant United States attorney had been instructed by his superior, the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to withdraw the offer. Id.
9. Id.
10. Cooper was convicted on two counts for bribery of a witness under IB
U.S.c. § 201(e) (1976), and on two counts for obstruction of justice under IB U.S.C. §
1503 (1976).
II. 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979).
12. Id. at 12.
13. The court of appeals determined that the defendant Cooper would be al
lowed to enter a plea of guilty to one count of obstruction of justice under IB U.S.C.
§ 1503 (1976), and that upon the entry of a guilty plea to the single count, the indict
ment would be dismissed as to all remaining counts. Id. at 21.
14. Id. at lB.
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formly had held that plea agreements were to be analyzed using
contract law analogies. 15 Instead, the court held that, in appro
priate circumstances, a constitutional right to a plea proposal may
arise even before any technical contract has been formed. 16

II.

BACKGROUND

Plea bargaining is the disposition of criminal charges by agree
ment between the prosecutor and the accused. 17 This process plays
a critical role in our judicial system, accounting for the disposition
of approximately seventy percent of all criminal cases. IS If every
criminal charge required a full-scale trial, our state and federal
courts would be flooded. Court facilities would have to be ex
panded and the number of court personnel greatly increased 19 to
handle the volume of cases. 20 Without plea bargaining our system
would be tremendously overburdened. Plea bargaining, therefore,
is an essential part of our criminal justice system as the system is
presently structured. 21
Though integral to the American legal system, plea bargaining
contrasts sharply with the traditional disposition of cases by jury
trial. Thus, in this sense, plea bargaining has dramatically trans
formed the criminal justice system. 22 It has shifted the criminal
15. See notes 47-60 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
contract law analogies in the plea bargaining process.
16. 594 F.2d at 18.
17. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
18. See [1979] An. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. 108 (Table 55) (27,295 of the
32,913 criminal convictions in federal district courts during the 12-month period end
ing June 30, 1979 were the result of guilty pleas and pleas of nolo contendere). Chief
Justice Burger has stated that in the federal system alone, the number of trials would
double if the percentage of guilty pleas decreased by just 10%. Burger, The State of
the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970).
19. In the 12-month period ending June 30, 1979, 33,442 criminal cases were
terminated, amounting to a disposition~ate of 68.9%. The disposition rate is deter
mined by combining the number of cases which have been filed or are pending and
diViding them by the number of cases which have been terminated. [1979] An. OFF.
U.S. CTS., ANN. REP., supra note 18, at 107. In 1979, 3,667 criminal jury trials were
completed in the district courts, the lowest number completed since 1967. Id. Table
59, at 114. The low disposition rate and the low number of trials completed indicate
that the federal court system would be incapable of handling the increased trial load
if plea bargaining were not allowed. See also Burger, supra note 18, at 929.
20. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
21. Id. at 261.
22. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transforma
tion of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977).
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prosecutorial function away from the traditional model in which an
impartial trier of fact determines guilt or innocence after a formal
adversarial process. 23 Instead, plea bargaining encompasses in
formal negotiations between the defense attorney and the prosecu
tor to arrive at a mutually satisfactory plea and recommended sen
tence. The plea bargaining system has eliminated many of the
risks,24 uncertainties,25 and practical burdens26 of a trial, per
mitting the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources
on those cases which warrant the most attention. 27 Additionally,
law enforcement is furthered by permitting the state to exchange
leniency in sentences for information and assistance helpful in
prosecuting cases. 28
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger has under
scored the importance of plea bargaining by declaring the process
to be an essential component of the administration of justice. In
Santobello v. New York, 29 he stated that the disposition of charges

23. See generally Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW
34 (H. Berman ed. 1971).
24. To the defendant, a trial appears risky and unpredictable when compared
with the plea bargaining process. Many factors, including limited pretrial discovery,
indetenninate questions of credibility, and the uncertainties of jury decisions, make
the outcome of a trial unpredictable. In addition, unpredictability is often prevalent
in sentencing procedures. Most criminal statutes grant the judge a wide and largely
uncontrolled latitude of sentencing discretion. Plea bargaining eliminates many of
these uncertainties by providing a predetermined charge and sentence. See Note, su
pra note 22, at 564.
25. Id.
26. Among the practical burdens of a trial are costs and time. Plea bargaining
avoids the expenses involved in a trial, expenses that in a lengthy trial may be pro
hibitive. Plea bargaining minimizes costs and time by enabling courts to process
cases more expeditiously than they could by hearing full trials. In federal district
courts in 1979, the median time interval which elapsed from filing to disposition
through a guilty plea was nine months. This figure may be compared with 14 months
for bench trials and 15 months for jury trials. [1979] An. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP.
supra note 18, at 115-16. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
27. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976) (court hon
ored plea bargain by allowing defendant to plead guilty to second-degree murder in
return for dismissal of the first-degree murder charge). See also Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (Court rejected defendant's argument that his guilty
plea had not been voluntarily given); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 233-35, 318
N.E.2d 784, 788-89, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 629-30 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975) (court refused to enforce plea bargained sentence upon learning of additional
infonnation of which the pleading court was unaware at the time of defendant's
guilty plea).
28. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976).
29. 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
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after plea discussions is an essential and desirable part of the judi
cial process. Chief Justice Burger said that plea bargaining avoids
the corrosive impact which the enforced idleness of pretrial con
finement has on arrested persons, protects the public from accused
persons prone to continue criminal conduct while on pretrial re
lease, and enhances the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty by
shortening the time between charge and disposition. 30
The advantages of plea bargaining were first articulated in the
1970 United States Supreme Court decision of Brady v. United
States,31 the predecessor to Santobello. In holding that guilty pleas
are not constitutionally forbidden, Brady formally approved plea
bargaining, declaring that the plea bargaining process is inherent in
criminal law. 32 While Brady sustained the constitutionality of plea
bargaining, it simultaneously raised and left unanswered a number
of important issues. Foremost is whether a defendant has a consti
tutional right to relief from a broken plea bargain; that is, when the
government breaches the plea agreement, whether the defendant
has a constitutional right to have the agreement enforced. 33 Al
though numerous lower courts34 had dealt with relief for broken
30. Id. Despite its many advantages, plea bargaining is met with an equal
amount of criticism. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180, 1314 (1975); Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970). For criticism directed at specific
problems see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3 (the need to
regulate abuses of prosecutorial discretion); D. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 225-26
(the risk that innocent defendants will plead guilty); Gallagher, Judicial Participa
tion in Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards, 9 HARV. C.R.-c.L. REV. 29,
38-44 (1974) (the coercive impact of plea concessions upon the defendant); Note:
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972) (the sentencing irrationali
ties of plea bargaining).
31. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the defendant's guilty
plea had been voluntarily given and that the plea had not been coerced by the death
penalty provisions for kidnapping.
32. Id. at 751-53.
33. Id.
34. See People v. Griggs, 17 Cal. 2d 621, 110 P.2d 1031 (1941) (when district
attorney's promise of a life sentence instead of death was not fulfilled, court allowed
withdrawal of guilty plea); People v. Fratianno, 6 Cal. App. 3d 211, 85 Cal. Rptr. 755
(1970) (court held that plea negotiations were only to make a recommendation, not a
promise); State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964) (court granted specific per
formance of plea bargain); People v. Chadwick, 33 A.D.2d 687, 306 N.Y.S.2d 182
(1969) (defendant alleged that court promised to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea under certain circumstances, court held promise was in effect upheld);
Courtney v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (court enforced plea bargain,
holding that county attorney abused his discretion); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442
Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971) (prosecutor promised life instead of death in return for a
guilty plea; court enforced promise).
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plea agreements, the United States Supreme Court did not address
this issue until it decided Santobello v. New YorP5 in 1971.
In Santobello, the State of New York indicted the defendant on
two felony counts. Subsequent plea bargain negotiations resulted
in an agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty
to a misdemeanor in return for dismissal of the original felony
counts. Furthermore, the prosecutor agreed not to make a recom
mendation as to sentence. At sentencing, a new prosecutor, igno
rant of his colleague's commitment, recommended the maximum
sentence, which the judge imposed. 36 The defendant's conviction
was unanimously affirmed by the state appellate court, and the de
fendant was denied leave to appeal to the New York State Court of
Appeals. 37 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the state's failure to honor the plea bargain vio
lated the defendant's constitutional rights. 38 The Court held that
the interests of justice and fundamental fairness required that the
conviction be vacated and remanded to the state courts to decide
whether to honor the plea bargain or to allow the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea. 39
Santobello presented the Court with three novel issues. The
first issue concerned whether a defendant has a constitutional right
to relief when the government has breached a plea agreement. The
second issue concerned identification of the source of that right in
the Constitution. The third issue concerned what remedy would be
allowed if that constitutional right was denied.
Santobello emphatically answered the first question, with all
participating Justices40 agreeing that a defendant has a constitu
tional right to some form of remedy for a broken plea agreement.
Santobello undisputedly held that "when a plea rests in any signifi
cant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled. "41 Unfortunately, the Court avoided di

35. 404 U.S. at 257.
36. Id. at 258-60.
37. People v. Santobello, 35 App. Div. 2d 1084,316 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1970), vacated
and remanded sub nom., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 257.
38. Id. at 257.
39. Id. at 263.
40. Justice Black and Justice Harlan did not take part in the Santobello opinion
as a result of death and retirement, respectively.
41. 404 U.S. at 262.

ENFORCEMENT OF PLEA BARGAINS

1980]

255

rect confrontation with the remaining issues. It identified neither
the constitutional source of this right nor the appropriate remedies
for violations. The Court's vagueness concerning the actual source
and nature of the constitutional right to relief for broken plea
agreements has left the lower courts without the tools to elevate
broken plea agreements to the level of constitutional violations. 42
Additionally, Santobello failed to provide courts with clear
guidelines to assist them in determining what remedies are appro
priate. 43
The Supreme Court in Santobello indirectly alluded to the
right to fundamental fairness embraced within the substantive due
process guarantees of the fifth amendment. In formally approving
the plea bargaining process, the Supreme Court stated that the
purpose of the process was to "presuppose fairness in securing
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor. "44 Santobello ad
monished that plea bargaining "must be attended by safeguards to
insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circum
stances. "45 Beyond these general allusions to due process guaran
tees, the precise source of the right recognized and given protec
tion in Santobello was not identified, but it was clear that the
source was based on constitutional considerations. 46

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE FOR PLEA BARGAINS

Courts, in an attempt to fill the gap between a constitutional
right and its source, typically have relied upon established common

42. Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bar
gains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 476 (1978).
43. A discussion of the appropriate remedies required when a broken plea bar
gain is enforced is beyond the scope of this note. For the remedy provided to
Cooper by the Fourth Circuit, see note 13 supra. On the issue of relief for broken
plea agreements, see Fischer, Beyond Santobello--Remedies for Reneged Piea Bar
gains, 2 U. SAN. FERN. V. L. REV. 121 (1973); Westen & Westin, supra note 42, at
471; Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1973).
44. 404 U.S. at 261.
45. ld. at 262.
46. The majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Burger, never explicitly stated
that the decision was based on a construction of the Constitution. Santobello, how
ever, involved a review of a state court decision with no applicable federal statute.
ld. at 257. For the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)
to reverse the state court below, it must have based its decision on federal constitu
tional grounds. Justice Douglas, concurring, specifically identified the right as consti
tutional. ld. at 266-67.
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law doctrines. 47 For example, in shaping the fourth amendment,
courts have analogized to the common law of agency,48 the com
mon law of trespass,49 and the common law of property. 50 Plea
bargaining, in its constitutional sense, has evolved in this manner.
Courts have identified the constitutional right to enforce a plea
bargain but have not identified the source of this right in the Con
stitution. Consequently, to fill the gap between the constitutional
right to enforcement of a plea bargain and the unnamed source of
that right, "[b]oth before and since Santobello, the courts have un
derstandably drawn heavily on the ready analogies of substantive
and remedial contract common law to supply the body of doctrine
necessary to order plea bargaining practices and to afford relief to
defendants aggrieved in the negotiating process. "51 At the same
time, however, reliance on contract analogies was often inade
quate. Thus, the courts were left without the means to enforce the
broken plea bargain, and the injured defendant was left remedi
less.
Courts, relying upon contract law for resolving the issue of
whether a defendant is entitled to relief for a broken plea agree
ment, have approached their analysis as if they were interpreting
an oral contract. 52 Thus, judicial inquiry has centered on the fac
47. See notes 48-54 infra.
48. People v. Stoner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 108,22 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 483 (1964).
49. Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
50. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Salvucci. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
51. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d at 15-16.
52. "[Tlhe decision in Santobello ... involved fundamental principles of con
tract law, notably those concerning mutually binding promises freely given in ex
change for valid consideration." United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, IlO9-IO
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977) (defendant allowed to introduce evidence of an oral promise
by the state; Court analogized to the parol evidence rule); Palermo v. Warden, Green
Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 295 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 9Il
(1977) (state's promise made in exchange for defendant's promise to return stolen
property was not made while defendant was under "extreme duress"); United States
v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's statements to the de
fendant concerning the sentence he could expect to receive as a result of a guilty
plea constituted a promise and was, therefore, an inducement for the defendant's
guilty plea); United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd,
476 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973) (state's promise was not
enforceable because the defendant did not perform his part of the bargain); Shields
v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 818-19 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977) (state may re
scind its promise any time prior to the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defend
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tual determination of' whether a plea agreement actually has been
formed. 53 This required examination of whether the defendant and
the government had exchanged a valid offer and acceptance. If
they had, the courts then sought to identify the terms of the plea
bargain. 54 Further issues raised in the plea bargaining analysis
have included full or substantial performance and detrimental reli
ance. 55 Finally, courts have considered whether the agreement was
breached, and, if so, whether the breach was excused. 56 In the
context of plea bargaining, each of these inquiries derives from the
general law of contracts. "To the extent therefore that there has
evolved any general body of 'plea bargain law,' it is heavily
freighted with these contract law analogies. "57 In fact, judicial reli
ance upon contract law analogies is exhibited in the majority of plea
bargaining cases. 58
The cases which result in findings that a defendant's plea bar
gaining rights have been violated are often based upon similar fac
tual situations. Typically, the defendant had entered a guilty plea
and in some instances had fully or substantially performed his side
of the bargain before the government revoked some element of its
plea agreement. 59 Accordingly, it was possible to view the defend

ant or other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreement);
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) (state's promise is en
forceable because defendant substantially performed his part of the bargain); People
v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 633 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (state's promise is not enforceable because of
fraud in the inducement). But see United States ex rei. Selikoff v. Commissioner of
Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (prin
ciples of contract law are inapposite to criminal proceedings); State v. Brockman, 277
Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) (the rigid application of contract law to plea
negotiations would be incongruol'~).
53. See notes 54-58 infra.
54. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 66 n.l (1977); Palermo v. Warden,
Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S.
911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975).
55. See Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-95
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman,
528 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1975).
56. See Palmero v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-96
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman,
528 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1975).
57. 594 F.2d at 16.
58. See note 45 supra.
59. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 259-61 (defendant pled guilty in
exchange for a promise by the government not to recommend sentence); United
States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 852-55 (7th Cir. 1978) (defendant pled guilty and
cooperated in an investigation); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545
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ant's situation as one perfectly analogous to that of a party ag
grieved by the breach of an express commercial contract or by the
failure of another to fulfill a promise upon which the performing
party had relied. 60
Reliance upon contract law, while providing the courts with
the means to resolve the problem of broken plea bargains, has
failed to answer the question left open by Santobello. Contract
principles do not identifY the source of the constitutional right
which entitles a defendant to enforcement of a plea bargain. This
failure illustrates the limits upon which analogies can be drawn
from contract law. At a certain point, the technical rules of contract
law fail to provide the court with a basis upon which to enforce a
constitutional right. The elements of an express contract or of
promissory estoppel are not present in every plea negotiation. Of
ten, in the court's perception, when these elements are lacking,
the defendant has suffered no legal wrong, and he therefore is not
entitled to relief. The absence of a contract breach, however, does
not mean that the defendant was not injured in a constitutional
sense.
Finding and enforcing a right which lies beyond those pro
vided by contract law analogy was the precise task facing the
Fourth Circuit in Cooper. Cooper requested that his constitutional
right to the offered plea bargain be enforced. Before Cooper ac
cepted the Government's offer, however, the Government revoked
the proposal. Thus, in classic contract law a contract was never
F.2d 286, 289-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (defendant re
turned $4,000,000 worth of jewelry in return for a promised reduction in sentence);
United States v. Hammennan, 528 F.2d 326, 327-30 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant
cooperated with the government in return for a promised suspended sentence);
Harris v. Superintendent, Va. State Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173, 1173-74 (4th Cir.
1975) (defendant pled guilty in exchange for a promised 24-year sentence recom
mendation); Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 863-69 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant
supplied infonnation to the government in exchange for a promised maximum sen
tence and no deportation); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 376-77 (4th Cir.
1974) (defendant pled guilty for a promised sentence recommendation); United
States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant pled guilty in re
turn for a promise of probation); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 946 (1st
Cir. 1973) (defendant pled guilty in return for a promised sentence recommenda
tion); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 426-27 (4th Cir. 1972) (defendant incrim
inated himself and others in return for a promised misdemeanor charge); State v.
Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Iowa 1974) (defendant testified and returned
stolen property in exchange for promised immunity and a reduced sentence); State v.
Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 689-92, 357 A.2d 376, 378-80 (1976) (defendant testified in
return for a promised sentence reduction).
60. 594 F.2d at 16.
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fonned since the offer was withdrawn before it was accepted. 61 Ac
cordingly, the Fourth Circuit recognized that under contract
analogies Cooper was not vested with any rights which could be vi
olated by the government or enforced by the courtS. 62 Further
more, Cooper could not rely on the defense of promissory estoppel
because there had been no tangible detrimental reliance by him. 63
Instead, he had been able to do no more than form the subjective
intent to accept the offer and experience whatever expectations of
benefit had been created by anticipation of its fulfillment.64 En
forcement of a contract on grounds of promissory estoppel requires
specific reliance and is measured by objective, not subjective,
standards. 65
Rather than rely on these contract law doctrines,66 the court
in Cooper chose to take the case "not one but two steps beyond"67
any earlier decisions, enforcing the plea bargain despite the fact
that contract analogies failed. Cooper held that in appropriate cir
cumstances a constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals
may arise before any technical contract has been formed. 68 The
conclusion in Cooper, that a constitutional right not only existed
but also had been violated, forced the court to identify the consti
tutional source of the right. The Fourth Circuit correctly identified
61. "The power of acceptance created by an ordinary offer is terminated by
a communicated rejection." A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 94, at 141 (one
vol. ed. 1952). "An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by a rejection...."
D. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-23(d), at 80 (2d ed.
1977).
62. 594 F.2d at 16.
63. A "promise may be enforceable by reason of action in reliance upon it. ..."
A. CORBIN, supra note 61, § 194, at 280.
64. 594 F.2d at 16. The use of promissory estoppel analogies requires the plea
bargaining process to have more substantiality than mere expectation and hope. [d.
at n.5.
65. [d.
66. In a situation in which the defendant has not yet entered a guilty plea or
taken other action constituting detrimental reliance upon the plea bargaining agree
ment, the government has been allowed to withdraw its offer. See Shields v. State,
374 A.2d 816, 818-20 (Del.) cen. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977); State V. Edwards, 279
N.W.2d 9, 10 (Iowa 1979); Wynn V. State, 22 Md. App. 165, 172,322 A.2d 564, 568
(1974); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977);
State ex rei. Gray V. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707 (W. Va. 1978).
67. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6. The court expressed this opinion in recognizing that its
holding was unsupported by its earlier decisions. [d.
68. [d. at 18. Even though the Fourth Circuit held that its decision was not
based on contract law, it emphasized that this holding does not deny the utility of
contract analogies in certain plea bargaining circumstances. The court stated that
Cooper was only expressing the limits of their utility. [d. at 17.
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the constitutional grounds alluded to in Santobello,69 naming the
fifth amendment guarantee of substantive dlle process and the sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as the con
stitutional source for its decision. 7o
The fifth amendment declares that no person "shall be de
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."71
The phrase, "due process of law," while recognized as difficult to
define accurately, completely, and appropriately under all circum
stances,72 has come to be interpreted as law in accordance with
natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of justice. 73 The
Fourth Circuit stated that the guarantee of due process is so basic
and plain that it eliminates the need for any explanation or
discussion. The court noted that the fundamental fairness guaran
tee of the fifth amendment is so inherently part of the plea bar
gaining mechanism that any mention beyond identification of the
constitutional right and source is unwarranted. 74
The sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of coun
sel was identified as the second source of the constitutional right to
enforce a plea bargain. 75 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the plea
bargaining process requires prosecutors to conduct plea negotia
tions through defense counsel. 76 The government's behavior has a
tremendous impact on the effectiveness of the defense counsel be
cause the government's positions and communications necessarily

69. Id. at 18 n.8.

70. [d.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928);
Green v. Fraizer, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920); Twining v. New Jersey, 21 U.S. 78,
99-100 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Brown v. New Jersey, 175
U.S. 172, 176 (1899); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885); Ha
gar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, III U.S. 701, 707 (1884).
73. The theme that the guarantees of due process reflect traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice prevails throughout the Supreme Court's decisions.
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
74. 594 F.2d at 18.
75. [d. at 18-19.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l). "The attorney for the government and the attor
ney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in
discussions with a view toward reaching [a plea bargain] agreement. ..." [d. See
Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 935 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (lack of effective
counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, in this instance, during the plea negoti
ations, is constitutionally defective).
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must be mediated through defendant's counsel. 77 "For this reason,
not only the credit and integrity of the government but those of his
counsel are involved in a defendant's perception of the process."78
Cooper emphasized the importance of effective counsel, de
claring the defense lawyer to be the essential medium through
which the demands and commitments of the government are com
municated to the citizen. 79 Any attempt by the government to
change or retract a position already communicated to the defendant
through his counsel would jeopardize the defendant's confidence in
his lawyer. 80 This would erode the effectiveness of counsel's assist
ance. 81 Taking these considerations into account, the court stated:
"[a]t the very least, these Sixth Amendment considerations add a
heightened degree of obligation to the government's fundamental
duty to negotiate with scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas. "82
The court of appeals, identifYing Cooper's constitutional right
to enforcement of the Government's plea proposal, attempted to
confine its holding to the narrowest grounds possible. 83' The court,
limiting its holding by emphasizing the factual elements most cru
cial to its finding, did not endanger the principles enunciated.
Rather, examination of Cooper reveals that the case embodied the
typical set of facts present in the overwhelming majority of plea
bargaining cases. 84 The factual elements limiting the holding in
Cooper are not atypical. The court held that a plea proposal must
be specific and unambiguous and must be made without any reser
vation related to a superior's approval. The proposal must be rea
sonable in content and must be made by a prosecutor with appar

FED. R. CRIM, P. ll(e)(I).
594 F.2d at 18.
79. Id. The court cited a remark by Justice Stevens of the United States Su
preme Court concerning the relationships among the defendant, the defense counsel,
and the Government. Justice Stevens, stressing the importance of effective counsel,
stated that the participation by an independent professional was of vital importance
to the accused and to society. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (concur
ring opinion).
80. 594 F.2d at 18.
81. Id. at 18-19. The court pointed out that this reasoning, although subtle, was
"certainly familiar to every lawyer who has had to take to his client bad news regard
ing his settlement negotiations with the other side, particularly when these involve
unfavorable changes of earlier positions." Id. at 19 n.9.
82. Id. at 19.
77.
78.

83. Id.
84. See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion and examples
of the typical plea bargaining situation.
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ent authority. It also must be communicated promptly to the
defendant so that no question of staleness is involved. The defend
ant must promptly and unequivocally assent to the proposal.
Finally, the assent must be made through defendant's counsel, who
must expediently communicate defendant's acceptance to the gov
ernment. 85 When a plea proposal embodies these criteria, constitu
tional fairness requires that the proposal be enforced. 86
The court, cautioning that the right to enforce a plea bargain
is not limitless,87 enunciated one condition limiting this right.
When extenuating circumstances that were unknown to and not
readily discoverable by the government when the proposal was
made supervene or become known, the plea may be withdrawn. 88
In other words, once presented, a plea proposal cannot be re
scinded without sufficient justification. 89 If the prosecution, prior
to the consummation of a plea bargain, learns that the defendant
has not told the truth, or if evidence comes to light that was previ
ously unknown, the prosecutor would be justified in withdrawing
the plea offer. 90
IV.

BEYOND COOPER

Cooper succeeded in answering the question left open by
Santobello, naming the fifth and sixth amendments as the source of
the constitutional right to enforcement of a plea bargain. In doing
85. 594 F.2d at 19.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The withdrawal of the plea proposal by the Government in Cooper was
a result of an objection voiced by a superior with respect to the offer that had
been made. The court pointed out that this reason does not qualify as an extenuating
circumstance. Id. But cf. Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 893 (1977) (state may withdraw from a plea bargain at any time prior to, but not
after, the entry of the defendant's guilty plea or other action by him constituting de
trimental reliance upon the agreement); State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa
1979) (state may withdraw from plea bargain prior to guilty plea); State v. Brockman,
277 Md. 687, 698, 357 A.2d 376, 383-84 (1976) (state may withdraw plea bargain if
defendant has not to a substantial degree and in a proper manner performed his obli
gation); Wynn v. State, 22 Md. App. 165, 172, 322 A.2d 564, 568 (1974) (plea bargain
should not be specifically enforced in the abst:nce of affirmative evidence of preju
dice); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977) (plea
bargain should not be enforced unless abuse of prosecutorial discretion and resultant
prejudice to defendant are found); State ex reI. Gray v. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707
(W. Va. 1978) (state is not bound to the terms of an inchoate plea agreement if the
defendant has not yet acted to his detriment).
90. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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so, Cooper constructed a solid constitutional foundation for the
right to enforce broken plea agreements. In providing the answer
to the question left open by Santobello, however, the Fourth Cir
cuit left three unknowns: First, whether Cooper spells the end of
the utility of contract analogies in plea bargaining analysis; second,
whether Cooper inhibits or enhances the plea bargaining process;
and third, whether Cooper will likely be embraced by other juris
dictions.
The Cooper court emphasized that it did not intend to end the
application of contract principles to plea bargain disputes in all cir
cumstances. Instead, it merely recognizes the limited use of these
analogies. 91 By noting these limits, Cooper avoids overextending
the relative certainties of established common-law analogies in de
veloping difficult constitutional doctrine. 92 Fear that courts will
overextend their use of contract law analogies does not require the
complete elimination of the use of analogies in the plea bargaining
process. "[A]nalogies from contract law will usually provide a reli
able inclusive test for the existence of constitutional right and viola
tion, but not an equally reliable exclusive test."93 Thus, when non
compliance with a technical contract rule directly impairs a defend
ant's formal acceptance of an offer, denying him a constitutional
right to enforce a plea bargain, the contract rule must not, in and
of itself, determine whether the defendant is entitled to enforce
ment of this right.
The second concern arising from the Cooper decision is
whether the holding will enhance or inhibit the plea bargaining
process. Cooper, reiterating the language in Santobello, stated that
a defendant's constitutional rights are confined to the process "rea

91. 594 F.2d at 17-18.
92. Id. The Supreme Court has observed that it is necessary to resist the temp
tation to take common-law analogies too far in developing constitutional doctrine.
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 n.8 (1977) (stating that the Court was not
dealing with notions of offer, acceptance, consideration, or other concepts of the law
of contracts, but rather with constitutional law); Stoner v. California, 376 US. 483,
488 (1964) (holding that rights protected by the fourth amendment are not to be
eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrine of ap
parent authority); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court's concern in determining the reach of the fourth
amendment should not be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass); Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980) (cautioning that it was unnecessary and ill-advised to
integrate into fourth amendment law subtle distinctions of private property law).
93. 594 F.2d at 17.
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sonably due" under the circumstances. 94 The limits of reasonable
ness are found by weighing the practical burdens imposed on the
government by recognition of the defendant's rights against the
consequences to the defendant if the rights are not recognized. 95
Prosecutors have protested that denying the government the
power to withdraw its offer unless extenuating circumstances ex
ist96 may severely impede the plea bargaining process. If the pros
ecution negotiates with the defendant on the premise that once it
makes an offer it will be bound, the prosecution may be extremely
reluctant to participate in plea bargaining. Courts have argued that
binding the prosecutor to plea agreements before the defendant
has entered a guilty plea or has detrimentally relied upon the
agreement might inhibit the dispositional use of plea bargaining by
placing the prosecutor at an absolute disadvantage;97 if defendants
are free to withdraw from plea agreements prior to entry of their
guilty plea, regardless of any prejudice to the prosecutor, then the
government in tum should be provided the right to withdraw. This
argument, however, ignores the principles of fundamental fairness
and effective assistance of counsel enunciated in Cooper. Enforcing
plea agreements does not put the government at an absolute disad
vantage; instead, the government is only required to act with fair
ness.
It is argued that enforcement of the offer, once it is made,
would eliminate the abusive practice of freely making and with
drawing plea proposals as a means of testing the will and confi
dence of the defendant and his counsel. 98 Cooper recognizes that
failure to find the arbitrary rescission of a plea agreement to be a
constitutional violation would necessarily give judicial approval to a
practice which has a clear possibility for abuse. 99 In addition to po
tential abuse of the plea bargaining process, allowing the prosecu
tor to rescind his offer might impugn the honor of the government
and public confidence in the fair and efficient administration of
justice. 1Oo The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 19.
96. See note 88 supra an accompanying text.
97. People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977).
After the defendant in Heiler agreed to a proposed plea bargain, the prosecutor's of
fice withdrew the plea offer because the bargain was contrary to the prosecutor's
charging policy.
98. 594 F.2d at 20.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (government

1980]

ENFORCEMENT OF PLEA BARGAINS

265

cuit has stated that "fundamental fairness and public confidence in
government officials require that prosecutors be held to 'meticulous
standards of both promise and performance.' "101
The final issue raised by Cooper is whether other courts are
likely to embrace Cooper's analysis of the plea bargaining process
when that process is beyond the limits of contract analogies.
Cooper acknowledges that its decision to enforce the right to a plea
bargain on constitutional rather than contract grounds takes it "not
one but two steps beyond"102 any earlier decisions. Cooper un
mistakenly identifies a constitutional due process right to specific
performance of a broken plea bargain. Santobello, however, did
not go that far. loa Though Cooper extended protection to a defend
ant when he has neither pled guilty nor detrimentally relied on a
plea agreement, the issue is whether other jurisdictions also will
extend Santobello in this manner. Two courts104 have specifically
declined to follow the Cooper extension, and prior to Cooper,
many states denied enforcement of plea bargain agreements in fac
tual situations comparable to Cooper. 105
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
identified the fifth amendment guarantees of fundamental fairness
failed to fulfill its promise that the defendant would not be subject to further prose
cution). See Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1975) (government
went back on its word); State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1974)
(state breached its promise not to prosecute defendant for a felony).
101. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir.
1976), cerl. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (prosecuting attorney failed to fulfill the
promise made during plea negotiations).
102. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6.
103. 404 U.S. at 261.
104. "We decline to follow the Cooper rationale." Government of V.I. v.
Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1980). In Scotland, the plea bargain was
factually similar to that in Cooper, but the availability of an alternative remedy, the
withdrawal of the plea by the defendant, caused the court to reject the Cooper rule.
[d. "We decline to follow Cooper." State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1979).
In Edwards, the defendant accepted a plea bargain in which his guilty plea to a mis
demeanor would be exchanged for dismissal of a felony charge. The state, however,
withdrew the offer before the defendant had an opportunity to enter a guilty plea to
the misdemeanor. [d.
105. See Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 843
(1977) (plea proposal withdrawn before guilty plea was entered); People v. Heiler,
79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22,262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977) (plea proposal withdrawn be
fore guilty plea was entered); State ex rei. Gray v. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707 (W.
Va. 1978) (plea proposal withdrawn before guilty plea was entered).
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and substantive due process and the sixth amendment guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel as the basis for the constitutional
right to enforcement of a plea bargain. lOS While prior cases have
granted constitutional protection to plea agreements, Cooper's util
ization of specific constitutional guarantees without the foundation
of contract law analogies is extraordinary. Cooper went beyond ex
isting case law and held that, under appropriate circumstances, a
constitutional right to enforcement of a plea bargain may arise even
before any technical contract between prosecution and defendant
has been formed. l07 In other words, under Cooper, a defendant
may be able to compel performance of a plea bargain on constitu
tional grounds even if he has not yet accepted or acted upon the
agreement.
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the fifth and sixth amend
ments in the plea bargaining context, however, must be scruti
nized. Dependence on the sixth amendment right to effective
counsel is suspect in the unconsummated plea bargaining situation.
Cooper held that any attempt by the government to change or re
tract a position already communicated to a defendant through his
attorney would jeopardize the defendant's confidence in his coun
sel. 108 On its face, this argument appears persuasive. Many events,
however, may occur during the course of a criminal case which
might disappoint the defendant. He often may be inclined, rightly
or wrongly, to blame his attorney for these developments. More
specifically, in any plea negotiation, even when it does not involve
the withdrawal of a plea proposal, the possibility exists that a de
fendant may lose faith in his attorney. For example, the govern
ment might decide not to offer a plea proposal or might offer only
one which the defendant considers unfavorable. A defendant's loss
of faith, without more, however, does not appear to reach the sta
tus of a constitutional violation. The appropriate focus for de
termining whether a defendant's right to effective counsel has been
violated is on defense counsel and his performance, rather than on
the defendant's perception of defense counsel. 109

106. 594 F.2d at 18.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 18-19.
109. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (lst Cir. 1978); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881,
887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); Marzullo V. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540,
543-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Moore V. United States,
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that its reliance on the sixth
amendment as a basis for enforcing plea agreements was shallow.
At the same time, however, the court was not willing to com
pletely dismiss this rationale, stating that "At the very least, these
Sixth Amendment considerations add a heightened degree of obli
gation to the government's fundamental duty to negotiate with
scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas. "110 By treating the sixth
amendment merely as supplementary support to its decision, the
court obviously emphasized that the fifth amendment due process
guarantees, rather than the sixth amendment guarantees, formed
the nucleus of its holding. In fact, the concept of fundamental fair
ness embodied within the substantive guarantees of the fifth
amendment, standing alone, is sufficient to support enforcement of
a broken plea bargain. The Cooper court correctly annunciated that
the denial of fundamental fairness is shocking to the universal
sense of justice. 111 The Fourth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Santobello, stated that, at the very least, a criminal de
fendant who enters into a plea bargain has the right to receive that
process reasonably due under the circumstances. 112
The Fourth Circuit further emphasized that its holding is lim
ited to factually similar plea bargaining situations. 113 This limitation
suggests that Cooper is an anomaly. This is an erroneous assump
tion. Despite the uniqueness of the Cooper holding, courts which
choose to follow Cooper should not be deterred from doing so. The
plea bargaining process encountered in Cooper is comparable to
a normal plea negotiation. 114 Subsequently, the facts of Cooper
should not provide an insurmountable obstacle. 115 A defendant

432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
1949), cer!. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
1l0. 594 F.2d at 19.
llI. See Kinsella v. United States ex reI. Singelton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
"Due process cannot create or enlarge power.... It has to do ... with the denial of
that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.' " Id. See also
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). "[Due process of law] formulates a concept
less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provi
sions of the Bill of Rights. . . . [It constitutes] a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice." Id.
112. 594 F.2d at 19.
113. Id.
114. See notes 83-90 supra.
115. See United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (Fourth Cir
cuit declined to follow its holding in Cooper on the basis of distinguishable facts). The
court stated that McIntosh did not fall within the plea bargain criteria enunciated in
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who enters into a typical plea bargain with the government is enti
tled to constitutional relief if the bargain is breached. Under
Cooper the fifth amendment provides the basis for this relief,
requiring the government to be held to a standard of fundamental
fairness.
Plea bargaining plays a critical role in the criminal justice sys
tem. As such, it is essential that the plea bargaining process be
conducted with the highest level of due process protections. At a
time when confidence in government is waning, government offi
cials should be held to meticulous standards of both promise and
performance in order to restore the public's trust. Enforcement of
broken plea bargains will help to eliminate the abusive practices of
government attorneys by regulating their prosecutorial discretion.
Though discretion is a critical part of a prosecutor's decisionmaking
process, this discretion is not limitless. Discretion must be regu
lated not only because the liberty of a defendant is at stake, but
also because the honor of the government and public confidence in
the fair and efficient administration of justice are at stake. U6 These
tenets are essential to a full understanding of Cooper's implications.
Cooper rightly provides an aggrieved defendant with the constitu
tional right to enforce a broken plea bargain. In doing so, Cooper
elevates the plea bargaining process "not one but two steps beyond
. . . earlier cases."117 As such, the Fourth Circuit's decision is an
important step toward improving the criminal justice system and
restoring public confidence in its administration.

Paul Briggs
Cooper. The alleged plea proposal in McIntosh was not in fact made and was ambig
uous. There was no evidence of any actual authority in the state prosecutor to act on
behalf of the United States, and no substantial evidence from which apparent author
ity could be found. [d. at 837-38 (Phillips, J., concurring).
116. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).
117. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6.

